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ABSTRACT
A policy is more likely to be economically efficient when its costs and 
benefits fall on the same group, but politicians can allocate costs and 
benefits to different groups within their jurisdictional commons. 
This article examines the distribution of costs and benefits from 
desalination projects using examples from San Diego, Almería and 
Riyadh. The examples illustrate how mismatches between costs and 
benefits can persist or change as politicians adjust the policy portfolio 
to balance inefficiency and political risk.
Common-pool resources are notoriously difficult to manage due to their non-excludable, 
yet rival nature (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). The management 
of common-pool water resources is even more difficult, because allocation decisions affect 
water as well as the costs of sourcing, moving and treating that water. Water projects are 
often subject to common-pool resource dynamics because water flows and infrastructure 
scale invite or require involvement from government bodies that have the power to allocate 
benefits and costs (Ostrom, 1965; Zetland, 2008). The existence of such a situation in which 
benefits and costs are shared need not lead to a dilemma in which the common-pool 
resource is mismanaged. It depends on how local political institutions manage the commons 
(Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994).
This article uses three case studies to illustrate how politicians allocate the non-excludable, 
rival common-pool costs and benefits of desalination in ways that can subsidize one group 
at the expense of another. Mismatches between costs and benefits matter to policy makers 
as they grow in magnitude and burden because less efficient, less fair outcomes attract more 
attention and controversy (Biswas, 2005; Braga, Strauss, & Paiva, 2005). This political-eco-
nomic perspective on allocation adds to basic economic discussions of efficiency by high-
lighting why interest groups might lobby politicians to change allocations and why politicians 
might choose one policy over another that seems more efficient (Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 
1967).
It will be useful to begin with a brief overview of the case studies, their cost–benefit 
mismatch, and their political conditions. In San Diego (USA), local politicians have told exist-
ing water customers that their payments for desalinated supplies would improve reliability, 
but reliability will actually fall (and political risk rise) if politicians allow developers to divert 
additional water to new homes (Zetland, 2009). The situation in Almería (Spain) is 
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simultaneously worse and better with new desalinated supplies. On the one hand, farmers 
have not reduced their unsustainable depletion of groundwater. On the other, the loss of 
that common-pool resource has increased the likelihood that farmers will buy more water 
from the desalination plants politicians have built for them (García-Rubio & Guardiola, 2012). 
The final case, Riyadh, illustrates how a royal decree can shield households from 99% of costs, 
until a newer decree lifts prices near to the full cost of service. These cases illustrate how 
politicians can allocate costs and benefits to different groups, but they also show that the 
resulting inefficiencies and subsidy burdens can make it hard for ‘unsustainable’ policies to 
continue.
The article proceeds as follows. The next sections explain how desalination can address 
scarcity and how politicians distribute the costs and benefits of scarcity. Three brief case 
studies then illustrate how desalination’s costs and benefits reflect local institutions. Those 
are followed by a short discussion of the impacts of desalination on the world’s climate (a 
global common-pool resource) and a concluding section on lessons learnt.
The political economy of water scarcity
Water is an important input to many activities that directly and indirectly benefit humans, 
but increasing water scarcity (or stress) makes it difficult to meet all demands (Zetland, 2014). 
Potential reforms must address this perceived excess of demand over supply, but they must 
also consider existing management norms. Most discussions of economic water use for 
direct human benefit treat water as an excludable good. Urban water supplies, for example, 
are sold to any member of the public (hence, a ‘public’ utility) in a system that is managed 
as an excludable, non-rival club good. Agricultural water rights, likewise, are treated as 
excludable, rival private goods. The next section will discuss management of non-excludable 
water such as common-pool water, but this section examines how exclusion makes it easier 
to expose users to price signals and other tools for balancing demand and supply.
In conditions of scarcity, economists reduce demand by shifting in or sliding up the demand 
curve. The demand curve of an individual or group shows how the value of each unit of water 
falls as more water is consumed. These values show priorities, i.e., for drinking over irrigation. 
Taking values as given, actual consumption – or quantity demanded – only occurs for units 
whose values are greater than the price of water. The demand curve can shift in with a change 
in tastes or technology that assigns lower values to water, meaning that less is consumed at 
the same price. One might, for example, decide not to have a lawn or use drip irrigation to 
produce the same greenery with less water. An increase in price, in contrast, reduces quantity 
demanded by choking off lower-valued uses, e.g., the tenth minute in the shower.
Supply can be increased in symmetric ways. Supply can shift out (delivering more water at 
the same cost) with a change in tastes or technical innovation, e.g., deciding to use recycled 
wastewater or implementing better desalination technology. Quantity supplied can increase by 
spending more money to use existing sources more intensively, i.e., sliding up the supply curve.
each of these options treats water as an excludable good, but the process of choosing 
which option to pursue depends on a non-excludable political process that affects everyone. 
leaders play a critical role in making policies that affect scarcity (Ostrom et al., 1994). In some 
cases, they may tighten exclusion so costs and benefits fall on the same people and efficiency 
increases (Baumol & Oates, 1971; Hoque & Wichelns, 2013). Or they might loosen or abandon 
exclusion such that costs and benefits fall on different groups (Mcevoy, 2014; Zetland, 2009). 
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This article will argue that leaders may manipulate the distribution of benefits and costs 
from desalination to promote their interests. The size of the resulting cost–benefit mismatch 
indicates the policy’s inefficiency and inequity, but the existence of a mismatch does not 
mean the policy is mistaken. Some policies may be inefficient compared to theoretical alter-
natives but more politically attractive.
Allocating costs and benefits in the commons
Most economic discussions of inefficient water use focus on negative externalities from 
private consumption or overuse of common-pool resources. These examples are similar in 
theory since the negative externality cost of one person’s action falls on another who cannot 
exclude or protect themselves from it, just as one person’s use of water in a commons leaves 
less for others who are helpless to prevent that use. In these cases, inefficiency can be blamed 
on inaccurate price signals and missing rights, respectively. Policies can change those out-
comes, and this article focuses on how politicians affect outcomes by allocating the costs 
and benefits of desalination projects. Although costs and benefits could be matched to treat 
the water as a private, excludable good, they are often mismatched, such that costs fall on 
one group while benefits go to another. This problem of mismanaging the ‘common-pooled’ 
costs and benefits of major infrastructure projects is well known (eckstein, 1958; flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003; Hirschman, 1967), but it is not inevitable. It is therefore 
important to define inefficient allocations and explain why leaders might allow or prevent 
them.
Conventional cost–benefit analysis collapses time, space and risk into a net present value 
(nPv) that is misleading when temporal, spatial and informational impacts are unevenly 
distributed. Why would impacts be uneven? Citizens prefer benefits that are known, local 
and current but costs that are unknown, distant and future. Those biases would explain why 
citizens support low-nPv projects that deliver sooner over high-nPv projects that deliver 
later (Kahneman, 2011). Or perhaps politicians emphasize local and current benefits while 
obscuring distant costs. This presentation may reflect the median citizen’s preferences if the 
resulting nPv is positive and losers are compensated, but – as Scitovszky (1941) pointed out 
in his criticism of this Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficiency – losers are not always compen-
sated. It is thus common for special interests to benefit when policies skew the allocation of 
common-pooled costs and benefits (Acemoglu & verdier, 2000; Kaufmann, 2005; Transparency 
International, 2008; Wallis, 2004; Zetland, 2010). Taking such a mismatch as given, it is likely 
to be problematic for politicians if citizens believe that excess costs are falling on them 
(Thorndike, 2006). Thus, choices or policies might be defined as ‘sustainable’ when benefits 
and costs fall on the same group but ‘unsustainable’ when benefits go to one group and 
costs fall on another. Although a politician might argue that such distortions serve the greater 
good – e.g. by helping citizens accept useful but complex ideas they may not have the time 
or ability to understand – one might just as easily argue that the distortions serve politicians’ 
selfish interests (Hall, 2000; Zetland, 2010).
Principal–agent theory explains why and how citizens use politicians as their agents. 
Public-choice theory explains why and how selfish politicians may betray citizens to serve 
their own or special interests. Combined, these theories give a simple model in which the 
average voter (principal) trusts their politician (agent) to represent their interest but where 
the politician may actually serve a special interest (public choice). In the case of desalination 
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projects, the agent serves the principal by implementing solutions that maximize expected 
net benefits to the principal. Betrayal of the principal occurs when the agent unfairly allocates 
pooled costs and benefits to principals as a means of helping themselves or special interests. 
The above definition of an unsustainable policy can thus be expanded from its economic 
base of costs exceeding benefits to a political dimension, i.e. ‘unsustainable’ if principals 
think their agents have given them the worse share of pooled costs and benefits.
These definitions will make it easier to discuss how desalination might come with a ‘sur-
prising’ distribution of benefits and costs. They also suggest how to reduce inefficient and 
unfair outcomes, i.e. reporting the size and distribution of a policy’s fiscal, environmental 
and social impacts to citizens who have some way of expressing their (dis)approval of the 
policy. Such a process could enhance efficiency, social cohesion and political stability.
Reliability or growth in San Diego?
The city of San Diego and neighbouring municipalities share approximately one year of 
surface storage capacity and possess virtually no groundwater reserves (SDCWA, 2015). The 
region (‘San Diego’, for convenience) receives most of its water from a complex aqueduct 
system that extends hundreds of kilometres to the north and east from its location at the 
south-west corner of the United States. That system is owned and operated by the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (Met), a cooperative of 26 member agen-
cies whose payments cover Met’s costs of importing water to the region. San Diego’s County 
Water Authority (the Authority) is Met’s largest member agency in terms of payments and 
water deliveries. The Authority and Met have a complex relationship that has survived over 
70 years of disputes (Zetland, 2008).
These basic facts mean that San Diegans face two costs for their water supply. The first is 
the cash cost of using energy and infrastructure to bring in water. The second is the expected 
cost of risk, i.e. losing access to imported water. Although some of this risk is physical (losses 
due to canal leaks, pipe breaks, weather variation and so on), its largest share is political, i.e. 
Met deciding – as it has on occasion – to reduce San Diego’s supply (Zetland, 2008). San 
Diego wants to reduce this risk by increasing local supply from wastewater or seawater. 
Although San Diego has recently expanded its recycled-wastewater programme, politicians 
convinced the citizens a decade ago to commit to a desalination plant (flannery, 2008). 
Poseidon llC opened the $900 million Claude ‘Bud’ lewis Carlsbad Desalination Plant in 
December 2015. (lewis, Carlsbad’s mayor until 2010, negotiated the original project for his 
city. The Authority took over the contract when financing costs and legal troubles rose.) The 
plant’s production capacity of 190 Ml per day will provide roughly 7% of the region’s total 
water supply (fikes, 2015).
Why have San Diego’s leaders pursued desalination when there are cheaper paths to 
reliability? The Authority has tried to reduce demand. efficiency improvements and aware-
ness have reduced water consumption from roughly 760 litres per capita per day a decade 
ago to current levels of about 570 litres per capita per day (SDCWA, 2016). Although residents 
use 40% of their drinking water outdoors, the Authority has not tried to complement the 
inward shift of demand by raising prices to reduce the quantity demanded (SDCWA, 2016). 
Why not? The first answer is simple. The utility’s price increases based on rising costs are 
controversial enough without adding scarcity surcharges that attract lawsuits (Stevens, 2014). 
The second is cynical. Politicians and developers want to sell more houses to new arrivals, 
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and higher water prices would discourage growth (Zetland, 2009). The third is psychological. 
Higher prices may cause a discrete change in tastes that results in dead lawns and – more 
important – an elastic response that lowers revenues. The fourth is tactical. Higher prices 
will reduce demand without increasing San Diego’s water security because lower purchases 
from Met would decrease San Diego’s ‘right’ to Met water, which it might want to exercise 
in a drier, future year (Zetland, 2008). These overlapping reasons explain why leaders might 
present a biased picture of the costs and benefits of desalination.
Allocating costs and benefits
The shift from living within current supplies to getting new supplies worries locals, who have 
paid for decades of growth benefitting land developers (Jennewein, 2015; Keatts, 2013; 
larson, 2013; Yerardi, 2014). In the current case, politicians have minimized perceived finan-
cial burdens by spreading the plant’s $900 million cost across all customer bills. The magni-
tude of this obfuscation can be calculated using Authority figures projecting that an “average 
household’s water bill would increase approximately $6 a month by 2016 to pay for” a 7% 
increase in supply (SDCWA, 2012). These two numbers allow us to compare the current, 
average-cost plan, in which all customers pay $6 per month, to a marginal-cost plan in which 
7% of customers pay the full cost of marginal demand, i.e. an additional $6/0.07, which is 
$86 per month ($1032 per year). Those additional charges would panic current residents by 
signalling an end to business as usual, and frighten potential migrants by signalling the true 
cost of their presence. note that this average-cost policy also weakens downward pressure 
on intensive and extensive demand(consumption and growth, respectively), by hiding mar-
ginal costs within a single price for the entire area (Zetland, 2008).
In a stylized representation of these differences, figure 1 shows how demand (solid) 
interacts with two different prices aimed at covering the costs of supply: the dashed line, 
with Sb representing baseline supply (roughly $815/Ml) and Sd representing the roughly 
doubled marginal cost of desalinated supplies (SDCWA, 2012, 2013). This supply curve inter-
acts with demand according to the way prices are set at P1 or P2. A price based on average 
cost results in a quantity demanded (P1, Q1) that necessitates the desalination plant. A price 
Figure 1. san Diego charges a low, average-cost price (P1) on water, such that quantity demanded (Q1) 
justifies the more expensive desalinated supply (Sd). prices at P2 (representing the marginal cost of 
desalinated water) would result in a lower quantity demanded (Q2) and thus no need for additional, 
desalinated supplies. source: author elaboration.
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based on the marginal cost of additional water from desalination results in a drop to a 
quantity demanded (P2, Q2) that renders the desalinated supply redundant (vedachalam & 
Riha, 2012). The important difference between these scenarios can be seen if consumption 
is limited to Sb. Will additional supply (Sd) raise the quantity demanded by charging P1 or 
lower it with prices at P2? A reduction in use would be a tough sell in a region whose popu-
lation has grown at more than double the national rate since World War II and has no plans 
to slow down (RWMG, 2013).
What about reliability and risk? An increase in price that reduces consumption when 
supplies are available leaves less room for cutting demand when supplies are scarce. More 
intriguingly, a reduction in water purchases from Met lowers the Authority’s ‘average draw’ 
on Met water, a reference point for allocating scarce water among Met’s member agencies 
that San Diego wants to preserve for future emergencies (a 20% cut from Q1 is less painful 
than a 20% cut from Q2). Desalination, in contrast, allows current behaviour and growth to 
continue at a small cost to the average customer. It also gives local leaders greater security 
in their interdependent relations with Met (Yousef, 2004).
What about the plant’s climate change impact? The plant will emit 61,000 tons of CO2e 
annually (voutchkov, 2008). The estimated damage from those emissions varies, but let’s 
assume a social cost of $50 per ton, or roughly $3 million per year, which works out to less 
than $0.005 per human. Going local, an offset of emissions under California’s cap and trade 
system, based on current prices of $12/ton CO2e, probably adds about $750,000 per year to 
costs, or $0.25 per San Diegan.
The only relevant fact from these calculations arrives as an afterthought: voutchkov (2008) 
assumes that the plant will be carbon neutral, because 47,000 tons of its emissions will be 
offset by a reduction in energy-intensive water imports from Met. Such a reduction does not 
make sense when regional plans promise a 30% increase in population by 2035 (RWMG, 
2013), but it does when you consider that voutchkov was a senior vice president at Poseidon 
llC until 2009. This contradiction did not go unnoticed by the California Coastal Commission, 
which had turned the company’s promise of ‘carbon neutrality’ into a condition for permitting 
the plant’s construction. The commission is asking Poseidon to address this matter of non-
compliance (CCC, 2016).
Are current policies sustainable?
The allocation of costs among existing customers for supply that will facilitate the arrival of 
newcomers suggests an unsustainable policy. The 20% drop in water demand in the most 
recent year of California’s ongoing drought has rendered the plant’s supply redundant, 
thereby strengthening that perception (Rivard, 2015; SDCWA, 2016). Politicians have 
responded, first, by pointing out that existing residents have received benefits from regional 
growth in return for subsidizing the arrival of new residents. Second, they can claim – given 
regional competition among cities – that growth will occur somewhere. An allocation of costs 
among all residents might be a pre-emptive policy for avoiding the conflict that might arise 
if cities built their own supplies. Private goods they might be in theory, but they would be 
common-pool in political reality should one city face shortages while its neighbour does 
not. These excuses are inadequate. The desalination plant strengthens the region’s supply 
portfolio, but its cost allocation sends the wrong message. Southern California faces future 
water shortage risks as climate change reduces supply and projected population increases 
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of 40% by 2050 increase demand (Keatts, 2015; Sanders, 2016). Politicians who allow this 
growth may be favouring special-interest developers over principals who want reliability.
Groundwater or exports in Almería?
It is conventional wisdom that irrigation is the lowest-value water use and desalination the 
highest-cost water source, but the value of irrigation water in Spain can exceed the cost of 
desalination (Calatrava & Martínez-Granados, 2012). This potential surplus explains why 
treatment plants are desalinating seawater and brackish water and recycling wastewater 
for irrigators in Almería, but it does not explain why farmers are paying a fraction of the cost 
for a fraction of the desalinated water produced (GWI, 2015). The explanation lies with policies 
that subsidize desalinated water while other policies fail to restrict groundwater over-draft-
ing. Politicians have allowed farmers to benefit from the common-pool resources of citizens, 
but changes in the water supplies are making those policies obsolete.
Almería is one of the most important and profitable provinces for agricultural production 
in Spain (Colino-Sueiras & Martinez-Paz, 2002). fernández, Thompson, Bonachela, Gallardo, 
and Granados (2012) estimate water’s value in production (its shadow price) to be $8–17/
m3 in this area (all currencies in the article have been converted to US dollars using August 
2016 market rates). The cause of such values can be seen in figure 2: immense investments 
in greenhouses, which simultaneously support a high willingness to pay for water and explain 
water’s small, 3% share of total production costs (Cabrera Sánchez, Uclés Aguilera, & Agüera 
Camacho, 2015).
High values and a low share of total costs do not mean that desalinated water is popular, 
as cheaper supplies exist. According to CAPMA (2012), three desalination plants treat sea 
and brackish water (32 and 42 Gl per year, respectively) for irrigators and/or cities but farmers 
use only 8.7 Gl of those supplies. That quantity accounts for only 10% of their total use 
Figure 2. satellite photo of campo Dalías, almería. source: nasa Jet propulsion laboratory (2011).
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because desalinated water is too expensive: $0.60/m3 after subsidies that cover half its 
 production cost. farmers get most of their supply from cheaper imported water and ground-
water, each accounting for 35% of total use. Surface and recycled wastewater supply the 
remaining 20% (CAPMA, 2012). Water accounts for a low share of total costs, but farmers are 
acutely aware of the politically negotiable price they pay. According to Giannoccaro, Castillo, 
and Berbel (2015), a representative sample of farmers from Almería are willing to pay $0.44/
m3 under normal conditions, and $0.63/m3 under drought conditions. Those values explain 
their lack of interest in desalinated supplies that cost more than other sources.
figure 3 provides a stylized representation of this situation, showing that farmers with 
high water productivity are willing to pay the full, marginal cost of desalinated water (Sd). It 
also illustrates that they would prefer – absent binding restrictions on groundwater use – to 
use more, cheaper (Sb) supplies. The question is how to shift their demand from critically 
over-drafted groundwater to desalinated supplies (lópez-Gunn, Rica, & Cauwenbergh, 2012).
Allocating costs and benefits
The Spanish government knew long ago that groundwater over-drafting was unsustainable 
(Albiac et al., 2003; Martínez Cortina & Hernández Mora, 2003). Over-drafting can be tackled 
by reducing demand or increasing surface supplies. Demand reductions could have come 
from irrigation efficiency or fallowing, but Almería’s greenhouses were very efficient, and 
fallowing was a political non-starter (Berbel, Mesa-Jurado, & Pistón, 2011). Given increasing 
controversy over surface transfers (Avirama, Katzb, & Shmueli, 2014; Gómez, Delacámara, 
Pérez, Ibáñez, & Rodríguez, 2013), the government launched a programme in 2004 that 
aimed to increase supply via desalination, wastewater reuse and irrigation efficiency 
(De Stefano, fornés, lópez-Geta, & villarroya, 2015; García-Rubio & Guardiola, 2012). The 
programme assumed that farmers would turn to desalinated water and pay the government 
for construction and operating costs, but farmers continued to exploit a regulatory loophole 
on self-supply that gave them access to cheaper, convenient groundwater (Albiac, Hanemann, 
Calatrava, Uche, & Tapia, 2006; MacMillan et al., 2010). The government faced a choice 
between selling low volumes of expensive water or subsidizing prices to increase volumes, 
raise plant efficiency and perhaps decrease groundwater stress. It took the latter option, 
Figure 3. farmers can afford to pay for desalinated water (Sd) although it costs more than groundwater 
(Sb), but weak regulations allow them to unsustainably over-draft groundwater for lower-valued uses, 
such that quantity Q1 is demanded, rather than the sustainable quantity Q2. source: author elaboration.
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with a promise to tighten groundwater regulations (Gómez et al., 2013), but progress has 
been slow (De Stefano et al., 2015; Molina & Melgarejo, 2015). The only sustained trend has 
been politicians’ willingness to give farmers easy access to common-pool water and money.
Are current policies sustainable?
Almería’s farmers are producing record quantities of food on record hectares of land as local 
groundwater continues to fall (De Stefano et al., 2015; Hortinfo, 2015). Politicians have already 
spent enormous sums on providing a desalinated substitute for local groundwater, but weak 
or ineffective regulations have not prevented further groundwater depletion. luckily for 
politicians, it seems that this unsustainable scenario is solving itself, as the rising cost of 
pumping groundwater is lowering desalinated water’s relative cost. Indeed, De Stefano 
et al. (2015) describe private desalination as a logical extension to the government’s pro-
gramme. One private plant is already in operation, but capacity will double if four planned 
plants come online (CAPMA, 2012).
The best part of the end of commons and the rise of desalinated water as a private good 
is the reduction in risk to politicians who try to protect remaining groundwater (Yousef, 
2004). The availability of desalinated water will make it much harder to claim that regulations 
are killing agricultural jobs by shifting the discussion of opportunity costs from lost jobs to 
lower profits.
This example shows how favourable conditions do not necessarily result in favourable 
outcomes; i.e. farmers may not shift from over-drafted groundwater to desalinated water 
even when they can pay. Politicians have allowed farmers to benefit from common-pool 
water and subsidies, but the unfair skewing of costs and benefits has helped end those 
policies. first came a halt to new transfers from other regions. Then came the end of the new 
supply programme. now comes the potential shift to a sustainable policy in which farmers 
pay the full cost of desalinated water they use as a private good as they reduce their demand 
on the over-stressed groundwater commons.
Expensive or cheap in Riyadh?
Roman emperors spent their personal wealth on aqueducts that supplied free water to public 
drinking and bathing facilities. It is still possible to drink from free-flowing spouts on Rome’s 
streets, but household water prices are much higher. Riyadh, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA), has pursued a similar path to Rome in a far shorter time. Until the end of 2015, water 
prices in the capital were kept at $0.05/m3 through royal subsidies funded by oil revenues 
(Abderrahman, 2001). The average household paid $2 per month for its water service, and 
six million Riyadhis used an average of 280 litres each. At the end of 2015 and a year of 
unexpectedly low oil prices, the KSA government announced massive increases in water 
and sewerage tariffs at the national Water Company (nWC). A household consuming 30 m3 
per month would see water’s marginal price rise from $0.03/m3 to $0.41/m3. A household 
consuming 50 m3 per month would pay even more: $1.62/m3 (GWI, 2016).
These prices had not been considered politically feasible when they were proposed years 
earlier (Abderrahman, 2006; Ouda, 2013a), but people have not taken to the street. Yes, 
citizens threatened to drill their own wells to avoid charges rising from $2 to $10 per month, 
and yes, the minister in charge of water and electricity was fired, but the higher tariffs remain 
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(Zaid, 2016). Higher tariffs are likely to reduce both demand and quantity demanded as 
customers reduce wasteful use, repair leaks, and so on (Ouda, 2015). The relatively large 
increase in tariffs is also likely to overwhelm the fall in quantity demanded, such that water 
revenues increase, which will reduce nWC’s reliance on government transfers. Both changes 
will make it easier for nWC and its partners to shift financing and attention from additional 
supply to improving operations, reducing leaks, increasing storage and so on (Ouda, 
Al-Waked, & Alshehri, 2014). The biggest losers from these changes – given government 
pledges to protect the poor from higher bills – will be construction firms deprived of new 
orders for desalination plants.
The recent radical changes in Riyadh make it possible to examine a change from the 
largest mismatch between costs and benefits to the closest match, two outcomes that are 
perhaps only possible with an absolute monarchy that can give a massive subsidy as easily 
as take it away. It is hard to imagine such a dramatic subsidy or change of policy in either 
San Diego or Almería. luckily for the citizens of Riyadh, the move to higher prices promises 
to deliver greater benefits than costs, an improvement that might be best understood by 
looking into the not-too-distant past.
Allocating costs and benefits
Under past policies, the government subsidized water prices but citizens got poor service 
because the nWC was not receiving enough money to expand Riyadh’s supply in pace with 
the demand for nearly free water. According to GWI (2014), total revenues to nWC covered 
only 10% of the $0.80–2.00/m3 in operating costs of the Persian Gulf desalination plants, 
located 500 km away and 600 m lower than Riyadh and the 400–2400 m deep wells drilled 
50 km away (Al-Zahrani, 2010; Ouda, 2015; Rodriguez-vidal, 2013). figure 4 provides a stylized 
illustration of how official prices (P1) were far lower than the cost of supplies from brackish 
groundwater (Sb) and desalinated water (Sd).
1
figure 4 also shows how the quantity demanded at P1, by exceeding supply, leads to 
service interruptions that result in customers facing a shadow price (P3) high enough to 
lower the quantity demanded to Q3. Riyadhis ‘pay’ P3 through lower reliability, contamination, 
and storage costs, and spending time and money on tanker water deliveries. Citizens 
probably saw such inconveniences as tolerable when water was so cheap, but some may 
Figure 4. the cost of supply from groundwater (Sb) and desalination (Sd) is much higher than the price of 
water (P1). excess demand at that price is cut back by interruptions in service, such that the shadow price 
of water is P3 and the quantity demanded is Q3. source: author elaboration.
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have wondered whether subsidized water, electricity and gasoline represented a fair division 
of benefits between 21 million citizens and the plutocracy of 9000 princes (economist, 2015a, 
2015b, 2015c).
Putting governance issues aside, it is clear that the royal family and its government could 
afford to subsidize citizens as long as oil income flows were strong. KSA’s annual water and 
wastewater operating budgets were $3 billion, and capital expenditures roughly twice that 
(GWI, 2014). To these direct costs must be added the opportunity cost of energy inputs. 
According to USeIA (2014), KSA uses 2.9 million barrels of oil per day (MBD) for 60% of its 
energy supply, most of which is bought at internal prices reflecting the $4–15/bbl domestic 
cost of extraction. Of the 2.9 MBD, 0.7 MBD goes to power. The assumption that one-quarter 
of that quantity goes to desalination (0.175 MBD, or 3% of total energy use), combined with 
an oil price of $50/bbl, gives an opportunity cost of roughly $7 million per day, or $2.5 billion 
per year. Water subsidies totalling $10–12 billion per year (around $500 per citizen) may 
have been acceptable in 2013, when oil export revenues were $280 billion, but not as much 
in 2015, with revenue projections of $160 billion (Mahdi, 2014; nereim & Carey, 2015). It has 
long been known that subsidized domestic water prices increase consumption of water, 
money and energy (Al-Sheikh, 1998), but low oil prices made those policies unsustainable 
for KSA’s leaders.
Are current policies sustainable?
Cheap water policies wasted water, money and energy while delivering bad service. The 
recent removal of most subsidies is likely to reduce demand (e.g. to point Q2 in figure 4), 
which is likely to reduce pressure on aquifers, reduce energy consumption, and help nWC 
improve reliability (Ouda et al., 2014).
The knock-on effects of the move to full water pricing might be considerable. Cheap 
water policies contributed to constantly increasing energy consumption and greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. KSA had ignored those trends in domestic affairs and tried to block 
their discussion in IPCC reporting (economist, 2014b), but emissions are likely to drop as 
recent increases in water and energy prices reduce quantities demanded. Higher energy 
prices might also curtail groundwater over-drafting.
According to Ouda (2013b), sustainable conventional (80%) and nonconventional 
(20%) supplies provide a total of 6.4 km3/year. That is more than enough water to meet 
municipal and industrial demands totalling 3 km3/year, but irrigation demand of 15 km3/
year (84% of total demand) depletes those sources as well as non-renewable ground-
water. The government has been tackling agricultural water use by winding down sub-
sidies for irrigated wheat, importing fodder for dairies, and investing in overseas farms 
(Karam, 2008; Zetland & Moeller-Gulland, 2012). Domestic agricultural output is likely 
to fall further as ‘fully priced water’ enters daily conversation, energy charges rise and 
water companies see aquifers as potential substitutes for costly desalinated water. 
Shifting water from farms to cities would be controversial in most countries, but Ouda 
(2014) says falling agricultural employment and production are not controversial in KSA 
because 80% of agricultural workers are foreigners and Saudi culture favours trade over 
farming. low oil prices may have forced leaders to unwind cross-subsidies to water users, 
but those changes mean that KSA has radically improved on unsustainable policies that 
contributed to inefficiency and risk.
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The global costs of local desalination
The discussion so far has focussed on the direct, local benefits of increasing desalinated 
water supplies whose local cash costs are buried in others’ bills (San Diego), partially subsi-
dized by the government (Almería), or paid almost entirely (or not) by rulers (Riyadh). Those 
local cost–benefit calculations are not complete, as desalination imposes indirect costs on 
others via GHG emissions (lattemann & Höpner, 2008; napoli & Garcia-Tellez, 2016). Table 1 
provides a rough estimate of the local (Capex and energy) and global (GHG) costs of 
desalination.
Are distant costs greater than local costs? In the case of Saudi Arabia – a country unapolo-
getic about its massive GHG emissions – the answer is probably yes, but the net harm from 
San Diego and Almería emissions appears to be quite small. San Diego’s plan to offset its 
GHG emissions will cost customers about $0.25 per year each. farmers in Almería pay indi-
rectly for carbon because power plants participate in the eU’s emissions trading system (eTS), 
but the low cost of eTS permits ($8.60/ton CO2e in 2016) means that GHG emissions cost 
almost nothing ($0.003/m3). Those small costs may suggest that governments can ignore 
the global impacts of cheap water policies, but the importance of climate change suggests 
otherwise (economist, 2014a).
Tragedy and triumph in context
This article has explored how policies allocating the costs and benefits of desalinated water 
can treat the water as a private good for which users pay full costs or a common-pool good 
for which some water users are subsidized by others. Although politicians might gain from 
directing benefits to a favoured group and costs to another, they must also weight the impact 
of inefficiency from wasted money and water and the risk of protests from those left with 
more costs than benefits. Three case studies explored the ways those forces varied with 
larger political and economic trends, thereby enriching the basic cost–benefit analysis of 
desalinated water policies.
In many cases, desalination policies interacted with other common-pool goods. A lack of 
centralized control over growth in the San Diego region meant that regional water supplies 
were subject to common-pool dynamics. In Almería, groundwater has been over-exploited 
Table 1.  production capacity, capital cost, energy consumption and GHG emissions for san Diego, 
almeria and riyadh.
notes: these figures reflect total capacity, use and cost in san Diego. In almería, use is less than capacity, even with subsidies 
to costs. for riyadh, figures reflect 20% of installed capacity, i.e. the marginal supply that allows consumption to rise from 
224 to 280 litres per capita per day (c. Doublet, operations Director of veolia Water saudi, Personal communication, 21 may 
2014,). energy and co2e statistics from voutchkov (2008) and GWI (2015), respectively. the largest shares of operating 
costs – and externalities – result from energy use. saudi arabia’s energy consumption and carbon output are much higher 
due to differences in desalination technology. facilities in california and spain use reverse-osmosis (ro) technology while 
many saudi plants use thermal multi-stage flash (msf) or multi-effect distillation (meD). according to anderson et al. 
(2008), ro produces 1.8 kg co2/m
3 while msf and meD produce 23.4 and 18.0 kg co2/m
3, respectively.
Ml/day $ millions GWh/year CO2e tons/year 
san Diego 190 900 246 61,000 
almería 60 102 55 13,570 
riyadh 420 1,595 2,540 1,960,000 
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due to weak restrictions on use. Riyadh suffered from water shortages because desalinated 
water was essentially free to households. These features help explain why the cost of desal-
ination was spread among all of San Diego’s residents to share the costs of growth, Almería’s 
farmers are turning to desalinated supplies as groundwater costs rise, and the Saudi gov-
ernment massively increased Riyadh’s water prices.
The discussion of costs and benefits at a larger scale and inclusion of special interests 
whom politicians might favour over average citizens clarifies the impact of desalinated water 
in a complex economic, political, social and environmental setting. Additional clarity does 
not, however, invalidate the relevance of economic efficiency, political risk and environmen-
tal impact to evaluating whether desalination policies are sustainable or not. San Diego’s 
regional commons may justify using average-cost pricing to spread costs across all residents 
rather than charging marginal prices to new arrivals, but that policy does little to reduce the 
risk that new arrivals will reduce water supply reliability. In Almería, the problem is fixing 
itself as farmers abandon overused common-pool groundwater for excludable desalinated 
sources, but the government can still align or distort incentives. Riyadh illustrates this aspect 
in its switch from an unstable system in which heavy subsidies could not meet consumer 
demand to a more balanced system in which customers pay costs, reliability rises and energy 
use falls.
All of these cases show how political action depends on local institutions, but their lessons 
apply elsewhere. first, the mismatch between the incidence of costs and benefits indicates 
the degree of inefficiency and risk of collapse from economic, political or environmental 
ruptures. figures 1 and 3 illustrate the gap between current and sustainable prices and 
quantities, i.e. P1 and Q1 versus P2 and Q2, in San Diego and Almería. In 2015 drafts of this 
article, the gap was even larger in Riyadh (see figure 4), where the impossibility of meeting 
demand at P1 reduced reliability by so much that the shadow price of P3 reduced demand 
to Q3. Price changes at the start of 2016 have moved the situation closer to P2 and Q2, simul-
taneously supporting the claim that larger gaps are likely to collapse and the prediction that 
higher prices are likely to be sustainable to the degree that they align costs and benefits to 
reduce inefficiency and political risk. Second, the effectiveness of and demand for desalina-
tion depend on local attitudes and relations. Greater trust between San Diego and Met 
would, for example, make it easier to exploit cheaper sources of supply, reduce risk via 
diversification, and utilize scarcity-based price signals to regulate demand (Zetland, 2008). 
fair and robust groundwater management in Almería would make it easier to ration desal-
inated, ground and surface waters among users. full-cost pricing in Riyadh makes it easier 
to discuss an end to irrigating with fossil groundwater – water that could protect the water 
security of a desert city of 5 million people living 500 km from the sea. Desalination has the 
potential to improve water security for all who share a water commons, but those improve-
ments will be wasted if the new water is allocated to new demand rather than bolstering 
existing supply, if beneficiaries pay less than the cost of the new water, or if existing unsus-
tainable practices are allowed to continue. Desalination is a tool, not a silver bullet.
Note
1.  See Ouda (2013b, 2015) for detailed information on KSA’s water supply and distribution network.
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